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In dealing with the influence of political considerations on the Constitutional 
Court's interpretation and application of the Bill of Rights it appears to be 
useful to first consider the meaning of "politics" in the judicial context, then to 
determine the considerations when politics are alleged to require the recusal 





I have not been able to find a judicial definition of "politics" or "political".  Most 
dictionary definitions of these terms refer to government and the state, 
opinions or attitudes regarding choices to be made regarding government and 
association with a group or party promoting a particular approach to 
government.  For present purposes, therefore, the opinions, preferences or 
attitudes of judicial officers regarding the manner in which the country should 
be governed and by whom, will be the focus of this analysis.  In the highly 
institutionalised area of contemporary party politics, the meaning of "politics" 
is easily reduced to support for a specific political party or grouping. 
 
It would appear that the Court considers it unavoidable that its judgments will 
in certain "crucial political areas" within its jurisdiction have "political 
consequences".  These areas constitute the core of the constitutionally 
allocated areas of jurisdiction of the Court, viz. disputes between organs of 
state, decisions on the constitutionality of Bills and legislation, amendments to 
the Constitution and of the conduct of the President.1 
 
The Court recently found it necessary in the Van Rooyen case2 (in which the 
constitutionality of the legislation and regulations pertaining to the magistrates' 
courts had to be adjudicated) to quote the following passage from the famous 
judgment of the Appellate Division in Minister of the Interior v Harris3 where 
Schreiner JA stated that: 
 
[t]he Superior Courts of South Africa have at least for many 
generations had characteristics which, rooted in the world’s 
experience, are calculated to ensure, within the limits of human 
frailty, the efficient and honest administration of justice 
according to law.  Our Courts are manned by full-time Judges 
trained in the law, who are outside party politics and have no 
personal interest in the cases which come before them, whose 
tenure of office and emoluments are protected by law and 
whose independence is a major source of the security and well-
being of the state. 
 
Chaskalson CJ followed this quotation with the following:4 
 
Under our new constitutional order much has changed since then 
and more changes are foreshadowed in the bill presently before 
Parliament.5  As was previously mentioned, judges are now 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Service Commission.6  Their salaries and benefits 
cannot be reduced,7 and a decision of the Judicial Service 
Commission supported by a resolution of two thirds of the 
                                                 
1 Paras [72] and [73] of the SARFU recusal judgment:  "Section 167(4) thus confers 
exclusive jurisdiction to this Court in a number of crucial political areas which include 
the power to decide disputes between organs of state in the national and provincial 
sphere, to decide on the constitutionality of any parliamentary or provincial Bill, to 
decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution and to decide 
whether Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation.  
And, in terms of section 167(4), this Court makes the final decision whether an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is constitutional.    . . . It 
follows that the drafters of the Constitution necessarily envisaged that this Court 
would be called upon to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which would inevitably 
have important political consequences." 
2 Van Rooyen v The State 2002 5 SA 246 (CC) para [82]. 
3 1952 4 SA 769 (A) at 789. 
4 Para [83]. 
5 Judicial Officers Amendment Bill 72 of 2001. 
6 Section 174(6) of the Constitution. 
7 Section 176(3) of the Constitution. 
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members of the National Assembly is required for impeachment.8  
Salaries and conditions of service are still fixed by regulation, but 
the Bill makes provision for an independent commission to make 
recommendations to government on the remuneration of judges. 
 
Over time the attitude of the South African bench toward matters of politics 
and policy has received much attention.  A useful historical mirror of current 
judicial thinking is to be found in Professor John Dugard's inaugural lecture of 
19719 in which he endeavoured to expose the endemic positivism in the 
judicial thinking of the time and the judges' refusal to recognise their own 
"inarticulate premises".  As a solution he offered two "antidotes"10: 
 
First, a frank recognition on the part of the judiciary that their role 
is not purely mechanical;  . . . and that in disputes between 
individual and State subconscious personal preferences are an 
ever-present hazard.  Secondly, what is needed is a conscious 
determination by judges to be guided by accepted traditional 
legal values . . .  
 
For present purposes a useful opening to an investigation into the influence of 
politics on the judiciary is to be found in the two judgments of the Court 





The matter of recusal of a judicial officer is of key importance to the 
development of practical guidelines for courts confronted with issues of a 
political nature.  The main judgment of the Court dealing with recusal, is that 
of the SARFU recusal case, in which justices of the Court were requested to 
recuse themselves from the case in which the appellant was the President of 
South Africa, who had appointed them to the bench of the Court.  Much of the 
                                                 
8 Section 177 of the Constitution. 
9 Dugard  1971 SALJ 181. 
10 At 195 
11 President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 1999 
4 SA 147 (CC). 
12 South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union v Irvin and Johnson Ltd 
2000 3 SA 705 (CC). 
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detailed grounds for the recusal application concerned the past political 
activities and affiliation of the justices. 
 
The essential test for recusal has been formulated as follows: 
 
The question is whether a reasonable, objective and 
informed person would on the correct facts reasonably 
apprehend that the judge has not or will not bring an 
impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that 
is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the 
submissions of counsel.  The reasonableness of the 
apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of 
office taken by the judges to administer justice without fear 
or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by reason 
of their training and experience.  It must be assumed that 
they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal 
beliefs or predispositions.  They must take into account 
the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which 
they are not obliged to recuse themselves.  At the same 
time, it must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a 
fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial and a judicial officer 
should not hesitate to recuse herself or himself if there are 
reasonable grounds on the part of a litigant for 
apprehending that the judicial officer, for whatever 
reasons, was not or will not be impartial.13 
 
The judgment in the SACCAWU case (deliverd by Cameron AJ, who was not 
a member of the bench that deciced the SARFU recusal case), provides some 
useful analyses of the former judgment.  The Court pointed out that the 
following considerations are prominent in the test for recusal:14 
 
1. A presumption that judicial officers are impartial in adjudicating 
disputes.  Consequently — 
• the applicant for recusal bears the onus of rebutting the 
presumption of judicial impartiality, and 
• it is a strong presumption, rebuttal of which requires cogent or 
convincing evidence. 
                                                 
13 Para [48] of the SARFU recusal case. 
14 SACCAWU case paras [12] – [17]. 
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2. Because judges are human, their life experiences will unavoidably 
influence their understanding of judicial duties.  "Absolute neutrality" in 
the judicial context is therefore not achievable.. 
3. Judicial impartiality, clearly dinstinguised from "colourless neutrality", is 
however an absolute requirement for a civilised system of adjudication.  
Such impartiality the Court defines as "that quality of open-minded 
readiness to persuasion – without unfitting adherence to either party or 
to the Judges's own predelictions, preconceptions and personal views."  
In practical terms, therefore, "a mind open to persuasion by the 
evidence and the submissions of counsel." 
4. A "double requirement of reasonableness":   
• the person concerned about the danger of judicial bias must be a 
reasonable person, and 
• the concern ("apprehension") itself must be reasonable in the 
circumstances.15 
Anxiety on the part of the litigant requesting recusal, however strong 
and honest, is therefore not sufficient:  " The court must carefully 
scrutinise the apprehension to determine whether it is to be regarded 
as reasonable.  In adjudging this, the court superimposes a normative 
assessment on the litigant’s anxieties.  It attributes to the litigant’s 
apprehension a legal value, and thereby decides whether it is such that 
it should be countenanced in law."16 
5. In recusal applications, two contending factors need to be weighed: 
• ill-founded and misdirected challenges to the composition of a 
bench should be discouraged, and 
• public confidence in impartial adjudication must be maintained. 
 
                                                 
15 Cf also S v Roberts 1999 4 SA 915 (SCA) para [32] approvingly referred to by the 
Court in the SACCAWU judgment (para [14]). 
16 Para [16] of the SACCAWU judgment. 
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3. JUDGES AND POLITICS 
 
Regarding the specific issue of the political opinions of judicial officers, the 
SARFU recusal case contains a number of relevant dicta which produced the 
following opinions: 
 
• Because courts are required to give reasons for their judgments, 
criticism of the judgments should be focused on those reasons and not 
be motivated by political discontent or dissatisfaction with the 
outcome.17  In the Mamabolo case18 the Court added that a court must 
in its judgments "rely on moral authority". 
• A judicial officer's constitutional duty is to "resist all manner of 
pressure, regardless of where it comes from."19 
• The Constitution requires of a judicial officer to adjudicate a case 
"according to the facts and the law, and not according to their 
subjective personal views."20 
                                                 
17 Para [68]  "Success or failure of the government or any other litigant is neither 
grounds for praise nor for condemnation of a court.  What is important is whether the 
decisions are good in law, and whether they are justifiable in relation to the reasons 
given for them.  There is an unfortunate tendency for decisions of courts with which 
there is disagreement to be attacked by impugning the integrity of the judges, rather 
than by examining the reasons for the judgment.  Our courts furnish detailed reasons 
for their decisions, and particularly in constitutional matters, frequently draw on 
international human rights jurisprudence to explain why particular principles have 
been laid down or applied.  Decisions of our courts are not immune from criticism.  
But political discontent or dissatisfaction with the outcome of a case is no justification 
for recklessly attacking the integrity of judicial officers." 
18 S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) para [16] per Kriegler j: "In our constitutional 
order the judiciary is an independent pillar of state, constitutionally mandated to 
exercise the judicial authority of the state fearlessly and impartially.  Under the 
doctrine of separation of powers it stands on an equal footing with the executive and 
the legislative pillars of state; but in terms of political, financial or military power it 
cannot hope to compete.  It is in these terms by far the weakest of the three pillars; 
yet its manifest independence and authority are essential.  Having no constituency, 
no purse and no sword, the judiciary must rely on moral authority.  Without such 
authority it cannot perform its vital function as the interpreter of the Constitution, the 
arbiter in disputes between organs of state and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights — even against the state." 
19 Para [104]  ". . .  The nature of the judicial function involves the performance of 
difficult and at times unpleasant tasks.  Judicial officers are nonetheless required to 
"administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance 
with the Constitution and the law."  To this end they must resist all manner of 
pressure, regardless of where it comes from.  This is the consitutional duty common 
to all judicial officers.  If they deviate, the independence of the Judiciary would be 
undermined, and in turn, the Constitution itself." 
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• Because the core values of the Constitution are in contrast to the pre-
constitutional dispensation, political opposition in pre-constitutional 
times to the old order is practically a requirement for appointment to the 
bench of the Constitutional Court.21 
• Nevertheless "all judges are expected to put any party political loyalties 
behind them on their appointment and it is generally accepted that they 
do so."22 
• In the opinion of the Court23 "it follows that a reasonable apprehension 
of bias cannot be based upon political associations or activities of 
judges prior to their appointment to the bench unless the subject matter 
of the litigation in question arises from such associations or activities." 
 
                                                                                                                                            
20 Para [70]  "That a judge may have engaged in political activity prior to appointment to 
the bench is not uncommon in most if not all democracies including our own.  Nor 
should it surprise anyone in this country.  Upon appointment, judges are frequently 
obliged to adjudicate disputes, which have political consequences.  It has never been 
seriously suggested that judges do not have political preferences or views on law and 
society.  Indeed, a judge who is so remote from the world that she or he has no such 
views would hardly be qualified to sit as a judge.  What is required of judges is that 
they should decide cases that come before them without fear or favour according to 
the facts and the law, and not according to their subjective personal views.  This is 
what the Constitution requires." 
21 Para [72]  "The core values of our new order are reflected in the provisions of section 
1 of the Constitution.  None of those values was recognised by the old order, which 
was replaced by the Constitution.  Where we used to have a supreme Parliament, we 
now have a supreme Constitution.  The Constitutional Court has been given the 
responsibility of being the ultimate guardian of the Constitution and its values."  And 
para [74]:  ". . . it would be surprising if respect and support for the core values of the 
Constitution by candidates for appointment to all of our courts, and particularly the 
Constitutional Court, were not taken into account by the Judicial Service Commission 
when preparing a list of nominees for submission to the President.  It would be 
equally surprising if the President and the Cabinet failed to do so.  Barely five years 
into the new order it is all but inevitable that in the professional or public lives of such 
candidates their antipathy and opposition to the evils and immorality of the old order, 
to a greater or lesser extent, would have manifested themselves.  The public hearings 
of the Judicial Service Commission reflect this reality." 
22 Para [75] then continues:  "In South Africa, so soon after our transition to democracy, 
it would be surprising if many candidates for appointment to the bench had not been 
active in or publicly sympathetic towards the liberation struggle.  It would be ironic 
and a matter for regret if they were not eligible for appointment by reason of that kind 
of activity." 





For the consideration of the question how a judicial officer should deal with 
personal political convictions when required to adjudicate in matters which 
have political implications, at least the following should be considered: 
 
1. There is a distinction between politically motivated judgments, and 
judgments having political consequences.  A judicial officer has no choice 
or control over the latter situation, which is brought about objectively due 
simply to the nature of the jurisdiction of the court.  A politically motivated 
judgment is however engendered entirely through the subjective 
predisposition of a judge.  The challenge to the bench is not to produce 
politically motivated judgments in cases having political consequences. 
2. To achieve this, requires great effort and it remains open whether it can 
actually be done.  It helps that adjudication requires the justification of the 
decision.  The conventional wisdom is that justice is achieved by an 
objective analysis of the facts followed by the objective application of the 
law to those facts.  If it is impossible for a person to be divorced from 
ingrained presuppositions and premises, can a judge be expected to 
deliberately go against all instincts in order to achieve justice? 
3. Perhaps an answer must be sought not in what goes on in the mind of the 
judge, but in the standards of justice to which decisions must comply . . . . 
 
